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MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE: A
MODAL APPROACH TO CALIFORNIA’S
PROPOSITION 66
Alan Romero*
For years, the California Supreme Court has adopted a deferential
posture when reviewing state constitutional challenges to a ballot
initiative. The decision in Briggs v. Brown underscored the degree to
which courts are willing to avoid striking down ballot initiatives on
constitutional grounds, such as by broadly construing the initiative’s
language to avoid constitutional problems. In construing the language
of Proposition 66 to avoid separation of powers problems, however,
Briggs effectively re-interpreted central pillars of Proposition 66 in
ways rendering it unrecognizable to Californians who cast votes for and
against the initiative. Such recasting of ballot initiatives raises
fundamental jurisprudential questions concerning the courts’ ability to
regulate the people’s reserved legislative powers vis-à-vis the initiative
process.
This Article examines the decision in Briggs and evaluates
principles of judicial review as applied to popularly enacted ballot
initiatives. This Article discusses various methods of constitutional
reasoning, and considers challenges and issues when applying these
approaches to the constitutional questions raised by Briggs. Briggs not
only raises salient separation of powers issues, but the decision raises
practical and political challenges as well. In the end, Briggs arguably
limited its inquiry to a particular framework of constitutional reasoning
without engaging the full breadth of argument archetypes that would
have bolstered its decision in light of various constitutional values,
institutional constraints, and political realities. In circumstances where
the prevailing analytical framework proves unworkable in the long-run,
courts should expand their analytical approach to include
considerations such as prudence, history, text, ethics, and structure.

* J.D., Columbia Law School; M.P.P., Harvard University; B.A., The George Washington
University. As a former student of Philip C. Bobbitt and Akhil R. Amar, I am grateful to them for
their inspiration, ideas, and guidance as a legal thinker. I also would like to express my gratitude to
the editors of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their insights and feedback throughout the
editing process. Their contributions undoubtedly made this a better, more incisive article. The views
expressed are my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Proposition 66 (“Prop. 66”) has engendered considerable debate
over the scope of judicial review as applied to popularly enacted ballot
initiatives.1 On November 8, 2016, California voters narrowly
approved Prop. 66, the terms of which expedited the death penalty
review process by, among other things, setting forth a five-year
timeframe for direct appeals and habeas corpus review.2 In so doing,
however, Prop. 66 raised salient constitutional questions that
culminated in the California Supreme Court decision in Briggs v.
Brown.3 Rather than strike down Prop. 66, the majority opinion in
Briggs recast otherwise facially mandatory time constraints imposed
on the judiciary, holding that the five-year timeframe was aspirational
rather than mandatory.4 To support its holding, the court relied on
longstanding case law that stood for the proposition that judicial
revision is the proper means for remedying constitutionally flawed
ballot initiative provisions—in deference to the electorate.5
The public reaction—not to mention the reaction of prominent
legal scholars—was swift and critical in many respects. While the
ruling cohered with California case law, it raised more questions than
it arguably resolved. From the standpoint of stakeholders,
practitioners, and legal experts, the decision raises valid issues
implicating practical workability and meaningful guidance for the
state judiciary moving forward. Additionally, to avoid the severe
outcome of striking down Prop. 66, the court reinterpreted facially
mandatory language and left in place a ballot initiative that was
significantly different from the measure that voters considered on
election night. This move raises considerable questions regarding the
proper scope of judicial review in the ballot initiative context, as well
as the proper approach to constitutional reasoning when the
workability of prior precedents is at issue.

1. See California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_66,_Death_Penalty_Procedures_(2016) (last visited
Nov. 17, 2019).
2. Id.; Letter from Kermit Alexander to Initiative Coordinator, Att’y Gen. Off. (Oct. 16,
2015), https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/150096%20%28Death%20Penalty%
29_0.pdf?.
3. 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017).
4. Id. at 59.
5. See id. at 37.
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In his seminal book, Constitutional Fate, Philip Bobbitt
articulates a set of modalities of constitutional reasoning, which
function as judicial review argument archetypes grounded in
longstanding constitutional traditions.6 This Article considers how
these modalities could apply to Briggs, with the goal of identifying
different ways that Briggs could have reached a decision that cohered
with core constitutional values.
In Part II of what follows, I sketch out the general background of
Prop. 66 and the Briggs decision. I discuss the salient provisions of
Prop. 66, and how they implicated the legal questions at issue in
Briggs. In Part III, I survey the different modalities of constitutional
reasoning, based on the discussion in Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate. I
briefly discuss how the doctrinal, ethical, historical, textual, structural,
and prudential modalities could apply to the issues raised by the
Briggs decision. I then conclude with final thoughts.
The purpose of this Article is not so much to critique the holding
in Briggs but rather to suggest that the court limited its inquiry to a
particular framework of constitutional reasoning without engaging the
full breadth of argument archetypes that would have bolstered its
decision in light of various constitutional values, institutional
constraints, and political realities. In circumstances where the
prevailing analytical framework proves unworkable in the long-run,
courts should expand their analytical palate to include considerations
such as prudence, history, text, ethics, and structure.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Proposition 66
Prop. 66 was the culmination of a contentious debate in California
concerning the state of capital punishment and efforts to reform its
appeals process.7 The Editorial Board of the Los Angeles Times, for

6. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–8 (1984).
7. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE FOR 2016, GENERAL
ELECTION 104–07 (2016), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/complete-vig.pdf (last
visited Nov. 17, 2019).
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instance, opined that “California’s death penalty is a dysfunctional
mess.”8
As of March 2020, California is one of twenty-five states where
capital punishment remains lawful.9 In recent years, an average of
twenty individuals per year have received death sentences.10
According to the Secretary of State’s Official Voter Information
Guide, “[o]f the 930 individuals who have received a death sentence
since 1978, 15 have been executed, 102 have died prior to being
executed, 64 have had their sentences reduced by the courts, and 748
are in state prison with death sentences.”11 Yet, no prisoner has been
executed in California since 2006.12
Complicating matters is the fact that public opinion polls suggest
that Californians are largely torn over capital punishment.13 Recent
surveys show that 47 percent of Californians oppose the death
penalty.14 In contrast, 48 percent would like to speed up the process.15
On November 8, 2016, California voters narrowly approved Prop.
66 by a margin of 51.1 percent to 48.9 percent.16 Among other things,
Prop. 66 required that habeas corpus petitions first be heard in trial
courts instead of the California Supreme Court.17 The text of Prop. 66
also required completion of direct appeals and habeas corpus petitions
within five years, and it also required any counsel representing a

8. The Times Editorial Board, Props 62 and 66: California Voters Should End the Death
Penalty,
Not
Speed
It
Up,
L.A.
TIMES,
(Sept. 3,
2016,
5:00
AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-prop-62-prop-66-20160826-snap-story.html.
9. In three of the twenty-five states, including California, governor-imposed moratoriums
have halted executions from proceeding. State by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 1, 2020).
10. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 7, at 104.
11. Id. at 79.
12. See, e.g., Inmates Executed 1978 to Present, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS &
REHABILITATION,
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/Inmates_Executed.html
[https://web.archive.org/web/20190403083057/https://sites.cdcr.ca.gov/capitalpunishment/inmates-executed-1978-to-present/] (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) (listing Clarence Ray
Allen as last inmate executed on January 17, 2006).
13. Public Opinion: Support for Repealing Death Penalty Grows in California, DEATH
PENALTY
INFO.
CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6365
[https://archive.deathpenaltyinfo.org/node/6365] (last visited Nov. 17, 2019).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), supra note 1.
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1509 (West 2019).
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condemned inmate to file a habeas corpus petition, if any, with the
trial court within one year.18
Proponents of Prop. 66 argued that expediting the review process
promotes justice for victims and the public at large, all while saving
taxpayer dollars.19 Alternatively, opponents underscored that Prop. 66,
as presented to the voters, was costly and poorly drafted—potentially
undermining important legal safeguards aimed at protecting the truly
innocent while creating further delays in the appellate review
process.20
B. Briggs v. Brown
Prop. 66 raised a number of state constitutional questions that
culminated into the legal dispute in Briggs v. Brown, a California
Supreme Court decision that upheld Prop. 66 but reinterpreted the
five-year timeline as advisory rather than mandatory.21 Soon after
Prop. 66 passed, Ron Briggs and former California Attorney General
John Van de Kamp filed suit alleging that the measure: (1) interfered
with the jurisdiction of state courts;22 (2) violated the separation of
powers doctrine;23 and (3) violated the single subject matter rule.24
One of the issues was a Prop. 66 provision stating, “Within five
years of the adoption of the initial rules or the entry of judgment,
whichever is later, the state courts shall complete the state appeal and
the initial state habeas corpus review in capital cases.”25 Plaintiffs
argued that the term “shall” rendered the timeline mandatory, which
implicated separation of powers issues because such constraints
unduly infringed upon the judiciary’s core powers.26 Moreover,

18. California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 29, 56–57 (Cal. 2017).
22. Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Including Writ of Mandate and Request for Immediate
Injunctive Relief; Memorandum of Points and Authorities Immediate Stay or Injunctive Relief
Requested at 17–25, Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017) (No. S238309), 2016 WL 11603995
[hereinafter Petition for Extraordinary Relief].
23. Id. at 25–37.
24. Id. at 37–47.
25. Briggs, 400 P.3d at 34–35 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6(d) (West 2016)).
26. Petition for Extraordinary Relief, supra note 22, at 28–32.
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plaintiffs challenged Prop. 66’s habeas corpus reforms on the ground
that it violated article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution.27
In a 5–2 decision, the California Supreme Court upheld Prop. 66,
interpreting the measure’s five-year timeline as advisory rather than
mandatory.28 Accordingly, notwithstanding language stating that
“state courts shall complete” appeals within five years, the court
construed that timeline as only “an exhortation to the parties and the
courts to handle cases as expeditiously as is consistent with the fair
and principled administration of justice.”29 The court reasoned that
“for over 80 years, California courts have held that statutes may not
be given mandatory effect, despite mandatory phrasing, when strict
enforcement would create constitutional problems.”30 Accordingly,
the court relied on long-standing precedent to support its holding,
underscoring that “while the statute is phrased in mandatory terms, the
same was true of the statutes at issue in the cases we have discussed.”31
In his concurring opinion, Justice Liu found it “stunning that
Proposition 66’s proponents . . . claim that the voters intended the
five-year limit to be nonbinding or aspirational when that claim is
plainly belied by the ballot materials and advocacy campaign for
Proposition 66.”32 Yet, Justice Liu acknowledged there was
longstanding precedent “construing similar mandates as
nonmandatory when necessary to save their constitutionality.”33
Justice Liu parenthetically noted that the measure’s five-year
requirement “cannot serve as a realistic benchmark to guide courts . . .
as they implement Proposition 66.”34

27. Id. at 18–25; see CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 (“The Supreme Court, courts of appeal,
superior courts, and their judges have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings. Those
courts also have original jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of
mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition. The appellate division of the superior court has original
jurisdiction in proceedings for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and
prohibition directed to the superior court in causes subject to its appellate jurisdiction. Superior
courts have original jurisdiction in all other causes.”).
28. Briggs, 400 P.3d at 34.
29. Id. at 59.
30. Id. at 56.
31. Id. at 58.
32. Id. at 62 (Liu, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id.
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Justice Cuéllar dissented and surmised that “[v]oters . . . would
not recognize the initiative the majority purports to uphold today.”35
Importantly, giving effect to such intent “violates the California
Constitution’s separation of powers provision.”36 Justice Cuéllar
concluded that in an effort to avoid this problem, the majority
“misconstru[ed] this mandatory five-year time limit as nothing more
than an ‘exhortation,’”37 and in doing so, “disregard[ed] the
electorate’s clear purpose in enacting Proposition 66.”38 The notion
that the five-year limit was merely an exhortation was “at odds . . .
with what the initiative says, how it was designed to work, and how it
was sold.”39
III. DISCUSSION: METHODS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REASONING
The opinions above broadly reflect the general contours of what
Philip Bobbitt ultimately described as the modalities of constitutional
reasoning, a set of argument typologies that could offer legitimate
bases for judicial review.40 A thorough discussion of these modalities
is beyond the scope of this Article, but it suffices to note that they
summarize analytical frameworks that make up our constitutional
grammar.41 The point of laying out these modalities is not to suggest
that one is more apt than another in any given situation.42 While
individual judges may be inclined to gravitate toward particular
modalities, or find some more appealing than others, each one is
grounded in longstanding constitutional traditions that give it an air of
legitimacy.43
A. An Appeal to Doctrine
The majority opinion largely grounded its analysis on
longstanding state law precedent that affirmed the judicial practice of
recasting ballot initiative language to avoid fatal constitutional
35. Id. at 69 (Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
36. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 70.
40. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 7. The modalities discussed are historical, textual, doctrinal,
prudential, structural, and ethical. Id.
41. Id. at 6.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 5.
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defects.44 Such reliance is the hallmark of doctrinal reasoning—a
common and longstanding approach in which a court cites cases with
parallel or analogous facts, holding that the legal rule from those cases
applies to the one before it and controls the outcome.45
This methodological approach was evident, for example, when
the majority opinion in Briggs discussed People v. Engram,46 a
decision that similarly recast facially mandatory language in flexible
terms.47 Briggs gleaned from Engram that “section 1050,” which
facially set forth mandatory requirements, was read in light of the
statute’s broader policy aim, “ma[king] it clear that the electorate did
not intend to impose an unreasonable limit.”48 The Briggs majority
analogized the matter before it with the statute at issue in Engram,
concluding that “[s]imilar considerations apply to section 1509,
subdivision (f)’s time limits for superior court rulings on initial habeas
corpus petitions.”49
To say that doctrinal reasoning is a legitimate methodological
approach is not to say that reliance on case law satisfactorily resolves
legal disputes in all circumstances. What should a hypothetical court
do when applying precedent proves unworkable, which may happen,
for example, when changes to different lines of cases have altered the
prevailing legal scheme in material ways?50 There is nothing novel
about this tension.51 But as Akhil Amar, Philip Bobbitt, Judge John
Walker have noted—not to mention as several appellate decisions

44. See, e.g., People v. Sandoval, 161 P.3d 1146, 1158 (Cal. 2007); Kopp v. Fair Political
Practices Comm’n, 905 P.2d 1248, 1290 (Cal. 1995); Thurmond v. Superior Court, 427 P.2d 985,
987 (Cal. 1967); Garrison v. Rourke, 196 P.2d 884, 889 (Cal. 1948), overruled on other grounds
by Keane v. Smith, 485 P.2d 261 (Cal. 1971); Lorraine v. McComb, 32 P.2d 960, 962 (Cal. 1934);
Verio Healthcare, Inc. v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 439 (Ct. App. 2016); In re ShafterWasco Irrigation Dist., 130 P.2d 755, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942).
45. See Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (June 20, 2006), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/; BOBBITT, supra note 6, at
7, 40–42.
46. 240 P.3d 237 (Cal. 2010).
47. Id. at 257.
48. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 60 (Cal. 2017).
49. Id.
50. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and
the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 82–83 (2000); John M. Walker, Jr., The Role of Precedent in
the United States: How Do Precedents Lose Their Binding Effect?, STAN. L. SCH. CHINA GUIDING
CASES
PROJECT
5
(Feb. 29,
2016),
https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2016/02/CGCP-English-Commentary-15-Judge-Walker.pdf.
51. See Amar, supra note 50, at 82–83.
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have held—doctrinalism cannot encompass the only valid basis of
constitutional reasoning.52 Otherwise, individual court decisions—
regardless of constitutional first principles—would reign supreme.
One could view this question as part of a broader issue of how to
engage, if at all, other methodological approaches to constitutional
reasoning when the preferred or default one proves problematic. As it
turns out, there is no need to review extraneous texts to explore these
possibilities, as the concurring and dissenting opinions in Briggs
discuss such approaches at some length.
B. Invoking Constitutional Ethos
With respect to ballot initiatives in particular, case law that
supports the Briggs decision is premised, in part, on notions of
deference to the electorate and direct democracy traditions.53 Such
deference reflects a values-based judgment, and Bobbitt aptly captures
this sort of appeal in his discussion of ethical reasoning, explaining
that “[t]his form of argument denotes an appeal to those elements of
the American cultural ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.”54
While not figuring as prominently as doctrine-based reasoning,
ethical reasoning is not foreign to our jurisprudence, whether at the
federal or state level. For example, the rule of lenity—a canon of
construction holding that any ambiguities in criminal statutes must be
resolved in favor of the defendant—reflects society’s aversion to
erroneously punishing the truly innocent, thereby justifying higher
standards of certainty and clear legislative intent before exacting
52. AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 238–41 (2012); Walker, supra note 50, at 4; BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 7;
see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 955 (1992) (Rehnquist, J.
concurring and dissenting in part) (“Our constitutional watch does not cease merely because we
have spoken before on an issue; when it becomes clear that a prior constitutional interpretation is
unsound we are obliged to reexamine the question.” (citations omitted)). Note that lower courts
should still be bound by the decisions of its appellate counterparts. The issue contemplated here is
the extent to which the California Supreme Court is bound by its prior decisions, not whether lower
level courts are bound by California Supreme Court decisions.
53. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1302 (Cal. 1978) (“[I]t is our solemn duty ‘to jealously guard’ the initiative power, it being
‘one of the most precious rights of our democratic process.’” (quoting Associated Home Builders
of the Greater E. Bay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 477 (Cal. 1976))).
54. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–22 (1991), as reprinted in JOHN
H. GARVEY ET AL., MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: A READER 9 (5th ed. 2004). Needless to
say, where there is a divergence between California and federal normative values, the ethical appeal
as applied to California courts would be to the ethos of California.
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criminal sanctions against the accused.55 This principle is not purely a
function of reasoned logic. Rather, it emanates from values imbedded
in the American cultural ethos that, over time, manifested into various
legal standards and presumptions such as the rule of lenity, proof
beyond reasonable doubt, and presumption of innocence. While these
standards and presumptions have not been explicitly codified in
constitutional text, such principles nonetheless have been
constitutionalized.56
With respect to California law, whether conscious or not, the
democratic ideal surfaces in various state court decisions. For
example, the court in California Ass’n of Retail Tobacconists v. State57
explained that “the initiative power must be liberally construed to
promote the democratic process.”58 Moreover, one way to explain the
courts’ aversion to striking down initiatives is that such aversion helps
counter its institutional anti-majoritarian stature,59 albeit constitutional
features of twelve-year terms and retention elections ensure that public
accountability figures into the judicial realm.60
In that vein, any reluctance to strike down duly enacted ballot
initiatives gives effect to the touchstone value of self-governance, with
origins rooted in the founding era. Notions of self-governance can be
traced back to the Preamble’s opening phrase, “We the People,”61 a
principle subsequently recast by President Lincoln in one of the most
influential expressions of American national purpose.62 As such, any
general reluctance to strike down duly enacted ballot initiatives stems

55. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 296–302 (2012).
56. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Forward: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J.
641, 643 n.5 (1996).
57. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 224 (Ct. App. 2003).
58. Id. at 236 (emphasis in original) (quoting Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Cal.
1991)).
59. See Owen Tipps, Comment, Separation of Powers and the California Initiative, 36
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 185, 199 (2006).
60. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16 (“Judges of the Supreme Court shall be elected at large and
judges of courts of appeal shall be elected in their districts at general elections at the same time and
places as the Governor. Their terms are 12 years . . . . ”).
61. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
62. Abraham Lincoln, President of the U.S., The Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863)
(transcript available at https://rmc.library.cornell.edu/gettysburg/good_cause/transcript.htm).
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from an appeal to our cultural ethos, as it helps overcome the countermajoritarian difficulty.63
For the foregoing reasons, doctrinal and ethical modalities are
frameworks that cohere with the majority opinion.
C. Historical Reasoning: The Past as Guideposts
Another salient constitutional method is to rely on historical
reasoning. Originalism is often associated with this approach, where
the interpretive analysis turns on how legal drafters understood what
they were enacting in light of historical currents of the time.
Needless to say, notwithstanding the self-governance ethos
discussed above, the history surrounding ballot initiatives and direct
democracy institutions offers a more complicated account of how prodemocracy trends evolved over time.
1. Founding Era Views of Direct Democracy
In a speech to attendees of the 1788 New York Ratifying
Convention, Alexander Hamilton issued the following remarks:
It has been observed . . . that a pure democracy, if it were
practicable, would be the most perfect government.
Experience has proved, that no position in politics is more
false than this. The ancient democracies, in which the people
themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of good
government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure
deformity: When they assembled, the field of debate
presented an ungovernable mob . . . .64
Hamilton’s view was not unusual at the time. In Federalist 10, James
Madison articulated his vision of republican government, not direct
democracy, arguing that “a pure democracy . . . can admit of no cure
for the mischiefs of faction. . . . [I]t is that such democracies have ever

63. The “counter-majority difficulty” is the perceived challenge or conundrum associated with
the court’s ability to overturn laws that reflect popular will. See Michael C. Dorf, The Marjoritarian
Difficulty and Theories of Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 283
(2010).
64. Alexander Hamilton, First Speech of June 21 at the New York Ratifying Convention (June
21, 1788) (transcript available at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-05-020012-0011).
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been spectacles of turbulence and contention . . . and have in general
been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.”65
This is not to say that there was a general consensus among the
founders with respect to the proper scope of direct democracy.
Thomas Jefferson—ideologically opposed to Federalists like
Hamilton—was more sympathetic to notions of popular governance
and the political power of the agrarian yeoman, all while remaining
skeptical of judicial review.66 But such sentiments did not translate
into full-fledged support for direct democracy. Jefferson held a
particular vision of republicanism—one based on agrarianism, antielitism, and localized politics—that nonetheless cohered with
representative democracy.67
In any case, the views of Madison and Hamilton largely prevailed
amid the ratification debates and were ultimately incorporated into the
constitutional framework.68 From 1789 to 1913, state legislators—not
the general electorate—voted for United States senators from their
respective states.69 Moreover, the electoral college70 and life tenure for
federal judges71 were non-democratic features of presidential elections
and judicial tenure, respectively. While one may make a distinction
between federal views and California-specific views on direct
democracy, the founding era views should still inform our
understanding of the prevailing attitudes that contextualize
California’s annexation to the union during the nineteenth century.

65. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 76 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2005).
66. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. John Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 308, 311 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (“[T]he opinion which
gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for
themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature & Executive also, in their spheres,
would make the judiciary a despotic branch.”).
67. See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 456 (2004).
68. Id. at 241–42.
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the United States shall be . . . chosen by
the Legislature thereof . . . .”), amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, cl. 1 (“The Senate of the
United States shall be . . . elected by the people thereof . . . .”).
70. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1–2 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President
of the United States . . . and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected,
as follows: Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State
may be entitled in the Congress . . . .”).
71. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall
hold their Offices during good Behaviour . . . .”).
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2. Progressive Era Populism
The Progressive Era marked a period associated with nascent
political activism and populism in response to the excesses of the
Gilded Age, such as extreme inequality, political corruption, and
social strife.72 Governor Hiram Johnson—an architect of California’s
initiative, referendum, and recall processes—emerged as a prominent
political figure during this period, assuming the populist mantle
associated with the Progressive Era.73
A core aspect of Governor Johnson’s political appeal was his prodemocracy, reformist agenda. In his first inaugural address, he stated:
It matters not how powerful the individual may be who is in
the service of the State, nor how much wealth and influence
there may be behind him, nor how strenuously he may be
supported by “big business” and by all that has been
heretofore powerful and omnipotent in our political life, if he
be the representative of Southern Pacific politics, or if he be
one of that class who divides his allegiance to the State with
a private interest and thus impairs his efficiency, I shall
attack him the more readily because of his power and his
influence and the wealth behind him, and I shall strive in
respect to such a one in exactly the same way as with his
weaker and less powerful accomplices.74
Here, Governor Johnson alludes to the class-based debates that gained
currency during the Progressive Era, focusing in particular on the
Southern Pacific Railroad’s grip on state legislative politics.75
In this context, the initiative process was introduced and defended
as a means to empower the populace amid the rising influence of
special interest groups.76 Governor Johnson explained:
72. Elizabeth Sanders, Rediscovering the Progressive Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281, 1283
(2011).
73. See
Origin
of
the
Species,
ECONOMIST
(Apr. 23,
2011),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2011/04/23/origin-of-the-species; Ruth Rosen, What
Would
Hiram
Johnson
Do?,
SFGATE
(Aug. 21,
2003,
4:00
AM),
https://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/What-would-Hiram-Johnson-do-2595193.php.
74. Hiram Johnson, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 3, 1911) (available at
http://governors.library.ca.gov/addresses/23-hjohnson01.html).
75. See id.
76. See id. (“When, with your assistance, California’s government shall be composed only of
those who recognize one sovereign and master, the people, then is presented to us the question of,
How best can we arm the people to protect themselves hereafter?”).
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[W]hile I do not by any means believe the initiative, the
referendum, and the recall are the panacea for all our political
ills, yet they do give to the electorate the power of action
when desired, and they do place in the hands of the people
the means by which they may protect themselves.77
By “protection,” Johnson meant protection from special interest
groups, like the railroads.78
Importantly, the justification offered in defense of the initiative
during the Progressive Era was distinct from founding era arguments
related to direct democracy. Governor Johnson did not so much
squarely address the founding fathers’ democracy-related contentions.
In fact, one would be hard-pressed to argue that he defended direct
democracy on the merits. Rather, he envisioned the initiative,
referendum, and recall processes as tools to circumvent special
interests that controlled the legislative agenda.79 In short, the initiative
process functioned as a battering ram of sorts against special interest
groups like the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.
3. The Historical Upshot
When viewed in this way, courts overstate the case, at least from
a historical standpoint, when inferring from the institutional features
of the initiative process that the electorate is supreme vis-à-vis the state
legislature. For example, the California Supreme Court has held that
“[t]he people’s reserved power of initiative is greater than the power
of the legislative body.”80 This assertion is premised on the following
simplified syllogism: (1) the legislature may not bind future
legislatures; (2) the legislature may not bind the electorate; (3) the
electorate may amend or repeal acts passed by the legislature; (4) the
electorate may amend or repeal past initiatives; (5) therefore, the
electorate may bind the legislature, but the legislature may not bind
the electorate, rendering the electorate supreme.81

77. Id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 574 (Cal. 1995).
81. See id.; see also Owen Tipps, supra note 59, at 198 (“The inability on the part of the state
legislature to amend or repeal initiated laws has led the California Supreme Court to conclude that
in this connection the people’s initiative power is superior to the state legislature’s lawmaking
power. Specifically, this superiority consists in the fact that whereas the legislature may not pass
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A faithful account of early twentieth century history, however,
renders this logic overly formalistic. The asymmetry between the
legislature and electorate can be explained by the fact that it gives
effect to Governor Johnson’s notion of a battering ram.82 The initiative
power would be hollow if the legislature—a 1911 pawn for special
interests—could readily frustrate via amendment or repeal what the
California electorate enacted. As such, codifying this asymmetrical
procedural mechanism was the means by which the people could
“protect themselves,” as Governor Johnson argued.83
A more cogent assessment than what the California Supreme
Court has offered is that the direct initiative was grounded in a political
movement motivated by a desire to address the particular problem of
undue dominance of special interests. From this it does not follow that
the electorate was originally viewed as supreme.
D. Textualism as a Starting Point
Reasoning on the basis of legal text has some intuitive appeal.
Language—including the words that make up statutes or
constitutions—are conduits of meaning. Legislative language conveys
what drafters sought to codify into law—the bright lines, mandates,
licenses, and exceptions that constitute the body of law. The upshot is
that language offers direct evidence of legislative intent, which is why
text is a legitimate starting point for legal construction.
The key phrase, here, is starting point. Textualism should not be
the sole interpretive approach because language is an imperfect proxy
for conveying ideas or meaning.84 The textualist approach is of limited
utility, for example, when language is ambiguous or does not squarely
address a particular salient issue, whereupon it becomes necessary to
resort to other interpretative approaches.85
With respect to Prop. 66, the term “shall” is significant because it
suggests that the legislature intended to codify a mandate.86 Drafters
laws that bind future legislatures, laws passed through initiative may and do bind future legislatures
because such legislatures are unable to amend or repeal those laws.”).
82. See KEY & CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND THE REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 485 (1939).
83. Johnson, supra note 74.
84. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 37.
85. Id. at 38.
86. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 7, at 213 (“Within five years of the adoption of the
initial rules or the entry of judgment, whichever is later, the state courts shall complete the state
appeal and the initial state habeas corpus review in capital cases.” (emphasis added)).
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easily could have employed the word “may” but chose not to. Their
decision to instead use “shall” gives rise to the inference that a
mandate—not an aspiration—was intended. The fact that proponents
framed the five-year timeline as a mandate—and presented such a
construction to voters—is evidence of the will of the electorate,
notwithstanding case law or the nonexistence of an enforcement
mechanism.87
E. An Appeal to Structure
Textualism can be a significant tool for advancing robust
structural arguments—a common interpretive approach in its own
right. Structure-based reasoning entails making inferences from
constitutionally mandated relationships—whether they involve
people-state, county-by-county, or judicial-executive-legislative
relations. Such inferences may inform courts about the proper
contours of constitutional powers as applied to a set of facts.88
A useful starting point for the structural argument is the text of
the California Constitution, which sets forth the governing
institutional relationships and frameworks that are fodder for
interpretive analysis. When it comes to delineating the prerogatives of
each branch of government, the California Constitution goes further
than its federal counterpart.89 The California Constitution states that
“[p]ersons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise
either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution.”90 By
contrast, the United States Constitution does not contain such explicit
language, requiring faithful interpreters to read between the lines to
glean unwritten constitutional principles.91 California’s clear
87. See id.
88. BOBBITT, supra note 54, at 12–22, as reprinted in GARVEY ET AL., supra note 54, at 6
(“First, an uncontroversial statement about a constitutional structure is introduced [for example, *
* * the statement that the right to vote for a member of Congress is provided for in the Constitution];
second, a relationship is inferred from this structure [that this right, for example, gives rise to the
federal power to protect it and is not dependent on state protection]; third, a factual assertion about
the world is made [that, if unprotected, the structure of federal representation would be at the mercy
of local violence]. Finally a conclusion is drawn that provides the rule in the case.”).
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I–III; CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
90. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3.
91. AMAR, supra note 52, at 5 (“For starters, we must learn to read between the lines—to
discern America’s implicit Constitution nestled behind the explicit clauses. In short, we must come
to understand the difference between reading the Constitution literally and reading the document
faithfully.”).
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statement on the issue ameliorates any ambiguity that otherwise could
have arisen in circumstances when separation of powers issues are
implicated.
Additionally, the California Constitution vests legislative powers
“in the California Legislature . . . but the people reserve to themselves
the powers of initiative and referendum.”92 The term “legislative”
connotes the power to make new, or change existing, laws. As the
court in Carmel Valley Fire Protection District v. State93 affirmed, the
core functions of the legislative branch include the power of “passing
laws, levying taxes, and making appropriations.”94 This, combined
with the explicit separation-of-powers clause, lends to the conclusion
that only the legislature, or the electorate via the initiative and
referendum process, may exercise “legislative powers.”
1. Briggs and the Structural Argument
Although relying heavily on doctrinalism, the majority opinion in
Briggs, at times, advanced structural arguments, particularly with
respect to its separation of powers discussion.95 In fact, the core
powers doctrine, as developed by California case law, is largely a
product of structural and textual reasoning. According to Briggs, the
upshot for the legislature is that “while the Legislature has broad
authority to regulate procedure, the constitutional separation of
powers does not permit statutory restrictions that would materially
impair fair adjudication or unduly restrict the courts’ ability to
administer justice in an orderly fashion.”96 Accordingly,
notwithstanding text or legislative intent, legislation may not interfere
with the judiciary’s core functions, which include the timing by which
courts administer their dockets.97
A substantial portion of Justice Cuéllar’s dissent also involves
structural reasoning and separation of powers analysis in particular.
92. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
93. 20 P.3d 533 (Cal. 2001).
94. Id. at 539 (citing CAL. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 8(b), 10, 12).
95. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 41–59 (Cal. 2017).
96. Id. at 56.
97. See Younger v. Superior Court, 577 P.2d 1014, 1024 (Cal. 1978) (“The purpose of the
doctrine is to prevent one branch of government from exercising the complete power
constitutionally vested in another; it is not intended to prohibit one branch from taking action
properly within its sphere that has the incidental effect of duplicating a function or procedure
delegated to another branch.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).

(9) 53.2_ROMERO (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

MAKING CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE

6/5/2020 1:01 PM

465

Justice Cuéllar explained that “[a] statutory limit on the amount of
time a court may spend deciding a case is an intrusion on
quintessential judicial functions and violates the California
Constitution’s separation of powers provision.”98 As such, two choices
were available: (1) strike down the initiative; or (2) recast the
mandatory language as an “exhortation.”99 In the end, in light of
longstanding precedent giving deference to duly enacted ballot
initiatives, the Briggs majority elected the latter.100 There are,
however, structural considerations, as Justice Cuéllar’s indicates, that
militate against the majority’s holding. While due deference to the will
of the people suggests courts should refrain from excessively engaging
in judicial review, the danger of reading legislative text beyond its
interpretative breaking point is that recasting legislative enactments
also aggrandizes the judicial branch as an institution. Such recasting
increases the risk that courts will exercise discretion over matters that
historically and logically have fallen within the policy or legislative
realm.
2. The Relationship Between Legislation and Public Policy
A corollary of the legislative power is the power to deliberate on
what the public policy should be on a particular issue. The court in
State Board of Education v. Honig101 aptly explained that the
“[e]ssentials of the legislative function include the determination and
formulation of legislative policy.”102 Policy judgments entail making
complicated trade-offs between practical consequences, such as the
pros and cons of setting a new tax rate at 10 percent rather than 15
percent, or how heavily to regulate a particular industry in light of
peculiar economic effects.

98. Briggs, 400 P.3d at 69 (Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (citing CAL. CONST.
art. III, § 3).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 59 (majority opinion) (“Accordingly, we conclude that the five-year review limit in
section 190.6, subdivision (d) is directive only. Its provision . . . is properly construed as an
exhortation to the parties and the courts to handle cases as expeditiously as is consistent with the
fair and principled administration of justice.”).
101. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (Ct. App. 1993).
102. Id. at 746.
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3. Public Policy Aims Versus Means
Deciding the general aim of a law is a public policy decision, in
and of itself. The jurisprudence on separation of powers has developed
such that the legislature or electorate mainly has the prerogative to
deliberate on policy aims, particularly the trade-offs between
competing visions of what should be done within a policy domain.103
Increasing the availability of affordable housing, for example, is a
general policy objective that is part and parcel of the legislative
power—a power that involves exercising judgment over competing
policy considerations such as fiscal impacts, economic conditions,
geography, and demography.104
Where relevant, courts may have to interpret statutes to ascertain
what the policy objectives are, and, as suggested above, statutory text
is a legitimate starting point.105 As the court in Hunt v. Superior
Court106 explained, “[i]n determining intent, we look first to the words
of the statute, giving the language its usual, ordinary meaning. . . . The
words, however, must be read in context, considering the nature and
purpose of the statutory scheme.”107 This task, however, is distinct
from deciding policy, which is not a core function of the judiciary.108
Notably, the means of achieving a particular policy aim is, itself,
a public policy decision. The former involves tradeoffs between
competing methods of achieving a policy aim—methods often fraught
with economic, moral, logistical, and political implications. Weighing
103. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281, 1283 (Cal. 1978) (“[T]he legislative power under our constitutional framework is firmly
vested in the Legislature . . . .”); Fitts v. Superior Court, 57 P.2d 510, 512 (Cal. 1936) (“[T]he
Legislature is vested with the whole of the legislative power of the state.”); Carmel Valley Fire
Prot. Dist. v. State, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 466, 469 (Ct. App. 1999) (“It is the Legislature’s prerogative
to declare public policy and to provide the ways and means of its accomplishment.” (citing Lincoln
Property Co. No. 41, Inc. v. Law, 119 Cal. Rptr. 292, 294 (Ct. App. 1975))), rev’d 20 P.3d 533
(Cal. 2001); Martin v. Smith, 7 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (Ct. App. 1960) (“The power to be exercised is
legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy, or plan . . . .” (quoting 5 EUGENE MCQUILLIN,
THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 255–56 (3d ed. 2013))); Tipps, supra note 59, at 195
(“Moreover, the initiative process has increasingly supplanted the state legislature in both enacting
legislation and defining public policy.”).
104. See generally AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M.
Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds., 2009) (broadly discussing housing policy issues, publicprivate partnerships, and intervention tools for policymakers).
105. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 31–32; SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 55, at 56–58.
106. 987 P.2d 705 (Cal. 1999).
107. Id. at 716 (citing Torres v. Automobile Club of S. Cal., 937 P.2d 290, 293 (Cal. 1997)).
108. See Carmel Valley Fire Prot. Dist. v. State, 20 P.3d 533, 538–39 (Cal. 2001).
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those tradeoffs is akin to the design blueprints, drawings, and
measurements that constitute architectural work. The architect
certainly develops the overall conception of a proposed building, but
the project’s success depends in large part on development of sound
blueprints and accurate measurements, subject to careful deliberation
and foresight.109 One would be hard-pressed to disaggregate the latter
from the architectural process.
In the context of ballot initiatives, whether the electorate actually
deliberates on policy is not the critical point. The constitutional
framework explicitly reserves certain legislative powers to the
people,110 creating the legal fiction that electors are policy architects.
4. Briggs on Public Policy Implications
The majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Briggs
considered, in varying degrees, the policy ramifications of a five-year
deadline. The majority opinion, for example, described these effects
as follows:
Meeting such a deadline requires the coordination of efforts
by multiple courts and other actors. . . . The Legislature must
provide funding sufficient for the superior courts to meet
their greatly expanded responsibilities under Proposition 66,
and for this court and the courts of appeal to expedite review
in capital cases without neglecting the other matters before
them. . . . [A]s a practical matter, writ relief to require us to
enforce the limit is unavailable, because there is no tribunal
with authority to issue a writ of mandate to this court.111
This passage underscores the policy issues at stake. Any “coordination
of efforts” and questions of “funding sufficient for the superior
courts”112 are policy considerations necessarily implicated by the fiveyear deadline, and any judicial decree to alter this necessarily
implicates policy.
109. See generally CRISS B. MILLS, DESIGNING WITH MODELS: A STUDIO GUIDE TO
ARCHITECTURAL PROCESS MODELS (3d ed. 2011) (providing step-by-step guide to basic and
advanced architectural design process modeling).
110. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“The legislative power of this State is vested in the California
Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the
powers of initiative and referendum.”).
111. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 57 (Cal. 2017).
112. Id.
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It is unclear why the detail of setting a five-year deadline (policy
means) should remain constitutionally distinct from the broader
question of expediting the death penalty review process (policy aim).
Both were expounded by the text of Prop. 66. Five years is one of
many plausible timeframes—each with its own economic, logistical,
and political effects. The decision of five years—and whether that
timeframe was mandatory or flexible—was fraught with policy
implications that affect the scheme’s viability. In the end, the
electorate decided not only that the death penalty review process
should be expedited, but also expressed how fast.113
It is also unclear why any failure to explicitly set forth a five-year
enforcement mechanism is constitutionally significant.114 A difficult
truth for proponents of Prop. 66 is that the initiative offered a poor
policy prescription for the vexing challenge of reforming capital
punishment. As Justice Liu stated in his concurring opinion,
[t]he realities of California’s postconviction death penalty
process mean that without a radical reorganization of this
court’s functions, a restructuring of the role of lower courts
beyond what Proposition 66 provides, and a significant
infusion of resources from the Legislature, the five-year time
limit is not remotely close to realistic.115
The uncertainty and heightened risk of unintended consequences
represent hallmarks of ill-conceived policy, and such policy-related
flaws are the sorts of matters that legislative committees are charged
with flagging and remedying. Failure to express an enforcement
mechanism is one of many flaws with Prop. 66, but it is unclear why
this one flaw justifies recasting otherwise mandatory language beyond
the fact that previous court decisions have upheld that principle. In the
end, Briggs effectively assumed the role of policy maker in the course
of remedying this shortcoming.

113. Id. at 34–35 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.6(d) (West 2016)) (“Within five years of the
adoption of the initial rules or the entry of judgment, whichever is later, the state courts shall
complete the state appeal and the initial state habeas corpus review in capital cases.”).
114. Id. at 58 (justifying holding on basis that “nowhere were the voters informed of the details
of an enforcement mechanism”).
115. Id. at 68 (Liu, J., concurring).
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5. The Structural Upshot
It is worth taking a step back to consider the structural
implications of the court’s decision and the extent to which it is
contrary to the structural features of the California Constitution.
As previously discussed, judicial deference to the initiative
process is based, in part, on the notion that doing so promotes “one of
the most precious rights of our democratic process.”116 However, as
Justice Cuéllar stated, it is another matter entirely to “pretend a statute
means what it does not simply so it can be saved.”117 Doing so has the
effect of aggrandizing the views of the judiciary above that of the
electorate—an institutional dynamic not reflected in the constitutional
text or history.
It is unclear what constitutional values are served by preserving a
popularly enacted law that is materially distinct, either in purpose or
mechanism, from what the electorate enacted. Even if the court
preserved the electorate’s general intent of expediting the death
penalty review process, supplanting the specific policy mechanics
chosen by the electorate amounts to a decision to render policy
decisions with respect to the specifics—even if the specifics are illconceived. This is inconsistent with Governor Johnson’s vision of
popular sovereignty and California’s tripartite constitutional
framework.
F. An Appeal to Prudential Considerations
Another approach is giving due weight to prudential
considerations. Bobbitt described this approach as a “constitutional
argument . . . actuated by the political and economic circumstances
surrounding the decision.”118 This argument can often involve a costbenefit analysis for gauging the practical effects of one ruling versus
another.119
Justice Cuéllar’s dissenting opinion accords with the prudentialist
approach to a significant degree. Concluding that the court’s holding
would likely result in inconsistent rulings for death penalty
116. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of S. Cal. v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68, 74 (Cal. 1986) (quoting
Mervynne v. Acker, 11 Cal. Rptr. 340, 344 (Ct. App. 1961)).
117. Briggs, 400 P.3d at 72 (Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
118. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 61.
119. Id.
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defendants, Justice Cuéllar’s dissent reasons that “[s]uch a scheme
would multiply the risk of conflicting rulings . . . . It is simply not
reasonable to interpret the constitutional provision to countenance
such a result.”120
1. The Import of Institutional Coherence
This reasoning evidences a concern over whether the judicial
outcome coheres with society at large, with the implication that
coherence is a constitutional value that strengthens the legitimacy of a
particular ruling. The upshot is that any ruling that creates further
confusion or chaos is disfavored, all else being equal.
Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye discussed one practical
challenge flowing from the Briggs decision in the following terms:
“[T]he Habeas Corpus Resource Center—that was originally
contemplated to provide the attorneys for these habeas corpus
petitions—are now having their salaries reduced, even though the
effort is that they take on more work. . . . I’m not sure how that’s going
to work out.”121 The uncertainty moving forward is problematic not so
much because the court failed a duty to streamline organizational
processes or preserve institutional resources. Rather, the problem
arises because institutions of government ideally should function and
cohere with one another, and the court’s decision arguably frustrated
this ideal.
At the very least, Briggs likely engenders further confusion for
lawyers and other capital punishment stakeholders. The court’s
decision did not address many of the underlying factors that contribute
to delays in the review process, such as the dearth of lawyers with
sufficient experience to competently handle capital appeals. As
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky poignantly noted, “[t]here simply are
not enough lawyers qualified to handle death penalty cases.”122 Nor
will the decision address the fact that, in any given moment, there is a

120. Briggs, 400 P.3d at 88.
121. Ben Bradford, California Chief Justice Expects More Death Penalty Lawsuits, CAP. PUB.
RADIO (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.capradio.org/articles/2017/12/11/california-chief-justiceexpects-more-death-penalty-lawsuits.
122. Erwin Chemerinsky, California’s Death Penalty Speed-up Is About to Be Undercut on a
Case-by-Case Basis. Here’s Why, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 30, 2017, 5:30 AM),
http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/california-forum/article170028282.html.
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backlog of capital cases that the California Supreme Court already has
to adjudicate, in addition to other non-capital cases.123
Despite procedural and jurisdictional changes, delays will likely
persist. Simply mandating expedited review will not ameliorate the
bottleneck that currently stymies the process. And although
transferring habeas corpus petitions to superior courts could help
reduce the backlog, the net effect would likely turn on whether
adequate funding is appropriated, a prospect that, at best, remains
uncertain.124
2. Implications for the Ballot Initiative Industry
Another practical consideration is how majority opinion affects
the ballot initiative process and industry, and whether these effects
undermine, rather than promote, principles of direct democracy.
Significant scholarship already has explored the state of the initiative
industry and its influence on well-funded special interest groups in the
best position to organize initiative campaigns.125 It suffices to note that
the ruling in Briggs could exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the antidemocratic tendencies associated with the initiative industry. The
Briggs ruling could potentially disincentivize ballot initiative
proponents from deliberating and scrutinizing the constitutionality of
what they are endeavoring to do. An expectation that the court likely
will find a way to save the initiative when confronted with
constitutional challenges, even if that means substantially revising its
language, could create a moral hazard of sorts for initiative drafters.
When viewed in this way, there is little need to internalize the costs of
losing a court battle on constitutional grounds, or its corollary need to
seriously think about whether the proposition passes constitutional
muster in the first place.
123. See id.; see also Briggs, 400 P.3d at 63 (Liu, J., concurring) (“The dearth of attorneys
willing to take on these assignments is due in part to the sheer enormity of the undertaking. A single
death penalty case can and often does dominate a lawyer’s practice for well more than a decade.”);
Scott Martelle, The Real Reasons California’s Death Penalty System Is So Slow, L.A.
TIMES (July 17, 2014, 11:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-ol-death-penalty-californiaunconstitutional-20140717-story.html.
124. Briggs, 400 P.3d at 66 (“It is unclear whether the Legislature will appropriate funds for
this purpose. Nor does Proposition 66 expedite the appointment of capital habeas attorneys. And
the constitutionality of Proposition 66’s restrictions on successive petitions (§ 1509, subd. (b)) has
yet to be fully tested.”).
125. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 35–36 (1995).
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Such moral hazards could inexorably alter the political calculus
and communications strategies involved in initiative campaigns. This
is particularly true when good-faith efforts to comport with
constitutional standards are politically difficult, or at least when the
unconstitutional position is much more politically palatable than the
constitutional one.126 In light of this, any inconsistencies with how
Prop. 66 was presented to voters and how it was subsequently
presented to the court should not be surprising.127 In an environment
where courts are ready to strike down constitutionally problematic
initiatives, drafters would be incentivized to cure any fatal
constitutional flaws at the outset.
3. Whether Courts Should Decide Policy
Another macro-level consideration is the degree to which courts
should deliberate on policy questions. Regardless of the state of
constitutionally mandated relationships, one may ask whether it is
simply prudent for the court to dabble in policy matters.
One colorable argument is that policy decisions are best reserved
for the political arena. That is the forum where all relevant
stakeholders and experts can weigh in on the wisdom and moral
import of proposed legislative options, with opportunities to proceed
only upon attaining sufficient consensus. American norms and
constitutional history are such that it would be inappropriate for these
groups to similarly weigh in on individual justices, because the court
is principally a legal, not policy, institution.
The Briggs decision potentially incentivizes initiative proponents
to shift the burden of deliberating difficult policy questions away from
the political branches and onto the courts. One question is whether
embracing a scheme where courts deliberate on policy issues is
desirable, as this is contrary to arguments originally advanced in favor

126. See Briggs, 400 P.3d at 89 (Cuéllar, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (noting the
court’s holding “encourages initiative proponents to repeat the bait-and-switch in the future”).
127. See CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 7, at 106 (“[Proposition 66] requires that the direct
appeal and the habeas corpus petition process be completed within five years of the death
sentence.”). But see Oral Argument at 52:02, Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017),
https://jcc.granicus.com/player/clip/490?view_id=12 (government counsel concluding that fiveyear timeline is not mandatory, reasoning similar statutes in other cases have been construed as not
mandatory in absence of enforcement mechanism).
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of the initiative process.128 As discussed above, the initiative process
was intended to empower electors vis-à-vis a legislature captured by
special interests.129 While it would be an overstatement to say that the
court endorsed a rule aggrandizing the judiciary vis-à-vis electors, the
court effectively assumed greater legislative-like discretion, as
evidenced by its justification for revising duly enacted initiatives.
As alluded before, a prudential argument is one that is attuned to
the “practical wisdom of using the courts in a particular way.”130
Admittedly, upholding a popularly enacted initiative coheres with
direct democracy norms—a benefit that favors saving Prop. 66.
However, one could view the procedural uncertainty, increased
likelihood of further litigation, and judicial aggrandizement as costs
for the judicial system and public at large.131 These costs disfavor
upholding the initiative.
4. A Counterargument Against Prudentialism
A potential counterargument is that California courts already
have considered the role of prudence and rejected such considerations
as irrelevant for judicial review. An often cited decision for this
proposition is Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v.
State Board of Equalization,132 which explains that the court “[does]
not consider or weigh the economic or social wisdom or general
propriety of the initiative.”133 As it turns out, the majority opinion in
Briggs cites Amador as authority for this proposition.134
A prudentialist could respond in several ways. First, citing
decisions like Amador cannot adequately rebut prudential arguments,
particularly with respect to California Supreme Court decision
128. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 74 (“[Governor Johnson] strongly urge[s], that the first step
in our design to preserve and perpetuate popular government shall be the adoption of the
initiative . . . .”).
129. Id.
130. BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 7.
131. See Chemerinsky, supra note 122.
132. 583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978).
133. Id. at 1283.
134. See Reply of Respondents Governor Brown and Attorney General Becerra to Amici Curiae
Briefs at 5, Briggs v. Brown, 387 P.3d 1254 (Cal. 2017) (No. S238309), 2017 WL 1334868 (“But
this Court has repeatedly indicated that such arguments are not relevant to a measure’s validity.
(Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219
[in adjudicating constitutionality of an initiative, this Court ‘do[es] not consider or weigh the
economic or social wisdom or general propriety of the initiative’].).”).
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making, because prudentialism, itself, is a modality of constitutional
reasoning, not an articulation of what the law is. Second, prudence
here refers to effects on fundamental matters of constitutional order
and norms, not whether a particular legislative policy, even if duly
enacted via constitutional processes, is wise.
In any case, Amador addresses issues that are distinct from the
ones implicated by prudentialism. Admittedly, Amador underscored
the “limited nature of [its] inquiry” and dismissed concerns that the
initiatives at issue would cause “actual or potential adverse effects” if
enforced,135 reasoning that such considerations would be improper
bases for judicial review.136 It bears emphasizing, however, that
Amador merely explains that the court could not evaluate the
soundness of the underlying law at issue. Amador does not squarely
address the meta-level issue of whether any resulting disruptions in
existing governmental institutions should inform the court’s decision
making.
The point here is not that prudence requires an assessment of
whether Prop. 66, as presented to voters, is sound policy. The
prudential point is that there ought to be greater focus on the
institutional consequences of a particular ruling.137 A prudentialist
could ask, for example, how revising Prop. 66 to save its
constitutionality bodes for the judiciary vis-à-vis the electorate and
legislature in the long run. Such foundational questions are beyond the
scope of what the Amador court discussed.
IV. CONCLUSION
While case law precedent certainly supports the majority opinion
in Briggs, the court’s decision also raises several questions that
complicate the institutional relationships between the judiciary,
legislature, and electorate. There were a number of legal tools that the
court could have employed to avoid this fate and strengthen its
decision.
The court in Briggs could have done more to illuminate how its
decision implicates the institutional design of the California
Constitution, particularly with respect to the separate roles of the
135. Amador, 583 P.2d at 1283.
136. Id.
137. See BOBBITT, supra note 6, at 63.
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legislature and judiciary, and other salient structural features. The
historical upshot complicates the import of California case law with
respect to the electorate’s supremacy vis-à-vis other constitutional
actors, particularly in light of how Governor Johnson and his
contemporaries viewed the initiative process. While the general prodemocracy ethos of California was implicitly evident in the court’s
decision, there is a colorable argument that the decision paradoxically
undermines such ethos in various respects. Finally, prudential
considerations militate against recasting reasonably unambiguous
propositions solely to avoid striking them down, as doing so could
adversely implicate the constitutional order and long-term institutional
coherence.
These considerations are raised not so much to critique the court’s
decision but rather to address a difficult constitutional conundrum that
may very well recur in the future.
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